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Abstract 
Recent research on involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) has 
shown that these memories can be elicited and studied in the laboratory under con-
trolled conditions. Employing a modified version of a vigilance task developed by 
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) to elicit IAMs, we investigated the effects of 
varying the frequency of external cues on the number of IAMs reported. During the 
vigilance task, participants had to detect an occasional target stimulus (vertical lines) 
in a constant stream of non-target stimuli (horizontal lines). Participants had to inter-
rupt the task whenever they became aware of any task-unrelated mental contents and 
to report them. In addition to line patterns, participants were exposed to verbal cues 
and their frequency was experimentally manipulated in three conditions (frequent 
cues vs. infrequent cues vs. infrequent cues plus arithmetic operations). We found 
that, compared to infrequent cues, both conditions with frequent cues and infrequent 
cues plus arithmetic operations decreased the number of IAMs reported. The com-
parison between the three experimental conditions suggests that this reduction was 
due to the greater cognitive load in conditions of frequent cues and infrequent cue 
plus arithmetic operations. Possible mechanisms involved in this effect and their im-
plications for research on IAMs are discussed. 
 
Key words: Involuntary memories, autobiographical memory, cognitive load, mind 
wandering. 
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Introduction 
For a long time mainstream research on autobiographical memory has been 
focused on the investigation of deliberately retrieved memories of personal events, 
intentionally generated in response to specific cues provided by the experimenter 
(for a review see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce 2000). However, our autobiographical 
memory is not just driven by our decision and commitment to remember. Autobio-
graphical memories might also come to mind involuntarily and spontaneously, with 
no preceding conscious attempt at retrieval (Berntsen 2009, 2010; Mace 2007).  
Up until recently, the most common approach for studying involuntary auto-
biographical memories (IAMs) has been the naturalistic diary method in which indi-
viduals are asked to keep a diary of IAMs they experience in everyday life (e.g., 
Berntsen 1996; Berntsen & Hall 2004; Mace 2004). These studies have revealed that 
IAMs are more likely when one is engaged in undemanding activities that require 
little attention and concentration (e.g., during relaxation and routine activities) 
(Berntsen & Hall 2004; Kvavilashvili & Mandler 2004) and that in the large majori-
ty of cases (80% or more) they are elicited by easily identifiable external (environ-
mental) cues, generally related to prominent, possibly thematic, aspects of the re-
membered experiences (e.g., Berntsen 1996; Berntsen & Hall 2004; Mace 2004). 
The fact that involuntary memories can be elicited by external cues allowed 
for designing laboratory procedures to investigate the phenomenon of IAMs under 
well-controlled conditions (Berntsen, Staugaard, & Sorensen 2013; Mazzoni, Van-
nucci, & Batool 2014; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili 2008; Vannucci, Batool, Pelagatti 
& Mazzoni 2014). These procedures have simulated the conditions that in more nat-
uralistic diary studies have been shown to facilitate the production of IAMs, such as 
          Cue frequency and involuntary memories 4 
being engaged in undemanding cognitive tasks and being exposed to cues that can 
potentially trigger IAMs. In one of the most successful paradigms, developed by 
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008), participants are exposed to a long sequence of 
trials of mostly horizontal lines and have to detect an occasional target (vertical 
lines) while being simultaneously exposed to irrelevant cue-phrases, presented in the 
middle of the screen (e.g., ‘relaxing on a beach’ or ‘crossing the street’). Participants 
are instructed to stop the procedure whenever they experience IAMs, to record basic 
details about the memory (i.e., memory description, triggers, concentration rating) 
and then resume the vigilance task. After completion of the task, participants are 
given a detailed questionnaire concerning the IAMs they recorded earlier. This pro-
cedure produces a fair amount of IAMs, the majority of which (85% in the original 
study) are reported as being triggered by the word-cues on the screen. 
The laboratory procedure for investigating IAMs can be used to investigate a 
pervasive problem in theorizing on involuntary memories, namely why, given the 
constant flow of external stimulation that can potentially trigger IAMs, we are not 
constantly flooded by them. We are after all immersed in an environment rich with a 
multitude of potential cues, and engaged relatively often in routine monotonous dai-
ly activities. Yet the daily rate of occurrence of IAMs, as indicated by diary studies 
(cf. Berntsen 2009), can hardly be described as a flood. What then are the factors 
limiting the incidence of IAMs? The present study aimed to address this issue by in-
vestigating the role of frequency of environmental cues and cognitive load imposed 
when these cues are presented.  
In the experiment reported here we employed a modified version of the 
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) procedure, already successfully used to investi-
gate IAMs (Mazzoni et al. 2014; Vannucci et al. 2014). The slight but important 
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modification consists of two elements. First, participants are not informed that one 
of the aims is to study involuntary memories, and they are asked to report whatever 
comes to mind, things about the past, plans, intentions for the future, etc., as long as 
these contents are not task-related. This makes the task more akin to a mind wander-
ing task (Schooler et al. 2011). Second, participants are asked to categorize their 
mental contents as memories vs. non memories (generically called thoughts) only at 
the end of the report. Within this modified IAM task we focused on the issue of cue 
frequency, namely the number of cues presented in a specific amount of time, that 
we hypothesized could be related to the number of IAMs. In particular, we tested 
three hypotheses – the volume hypothesis, the cognitive load hypothesis, and the in-
terference hypothesis – that could potentially account for the relative scarcity of 
IAMs.  
The volume hypothesis states that presenting participants with more cues, 
which could potentially serve as triggers, will lead to more IAMs. Currently, invol-
untary retrieval is thought to occur only when there is a sufficient match between el-
ements of the cue and central features or themes of the retrieved memory (e.g. Ball, 
Mace, & Corona 2007; Berntsen & Hall 2004). In a related vein, recent theorizing 
on IAMs stresses that only a subset of cues encountered in the environment has the 
potency to trigger involuntary memories. For example, referring to the cue overload 
hypothesis, Berntsen et al. (2013) showed that only cues that uniquely point to a sin-
gle memory, at the exclusion of other memory records, are capable to produce cue-
memory matches strong enough to elicit IAMs (see also Rubin 1995). These obser-
vations suggest that the main bottleneck for IAMs might simply be the lack of 
memory relevant cues in the environment. Thus, increasing the volume of cues in 
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the Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) procedure may result in more unique cue-
memory matches and thus more IAMs.  
By contrast, the cognitive load hypothesis states that more cues could poten-
tially lead to fewer instances of IAMs by imposing a greater cognitive load. Several 
studies have shown that IAMs are more likely to occur when the individual is in a 
diffuse state of attention, as for example during boring and/or undemanding activi-
ties that require little attention (e.g., Berntsen 1998; Berntsen & Hall 2004; Kvavi-
lashvili & Mandler 2004). Previous studies have also found that external distractors 
irrelevant to the task, might capture attention and therefore disrupt task performance 
(Forster & Lavie 2008a, 2008b). Also, an increase in cognitive demands was found 
to be associated with a reduction of task-irrelevant thoughts (McKiernan et al. 2006). 
According to these findings the analysis of the constant stream of environmental 
cues might tax the cognitive system in a way that precludes memory retrieval. An-
other possibility, suggested by recent findings in the literature on mind-wandering, is 
that cognitive load may decrease the amount of attention and awareness about men-
tal contents, and thus decreases the likelihood to notice existing mental contents, in-
cluding IAMs (for a review, Schooler, Smallwood, Christoff, Handy, Reichle, & 
Sayette, 2011).  
Finally, the memory interference hypothesis states that more cues can lead to 
fewer IAMs by creating memory interference at retrieval, interfering with the pro-
cess of forming or reporting IAMs. Although Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) 
showed that involuntary memories were retrieved faster than voluntary memories, 
their formation and reporting still took on average 4-5 seconds. Therefore, increas-
ing the cue frequency in the IAM task means that the process of forming a new 
memory may not always be accomplished before the next external cue is presented. 
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Because the newly presented cue is likely to match memory records that are differ-
ent from the one triggered by the previous cue, it can interfere with the process of 
forming the mental representation of the involuntary memory that would have been 
potentially triggered by the previous cue. Thus, increasing the frequency can poten-
tially interfere with forming IAMs, reducing the overall number of reported memo-
ries. At the same time, different cues are likely to activate different episodic nodes in 
memory and stimulate the network in parallel. This stimulation might create compe-
tition among stimulated targets and ultimately trigger interference at retrieval.  
The present study was designed to assess the effects of changing the cue fre-
quency in the IAM task with respect to the three hypotheses described above. We 
included three conditions in our study. In the “frequent cues” condition 300 cue-
phrases were presented over 450 trials (2/3), while in the “infrequent cues” condi-
tion, participants were presented with 90 word-cues over 450 trials (1/5) of the vigi-
lance task. The comparison between the two conditions allows for testing the vol-
ume hypothesis, which specifically predicts more IAMs in the frequent than in the 
infrequent cues condition.  
To distinguish between the cognitive load and the memory interference hy-
potheses, participants in the third “infrequent cues plus math” condition were ex-
posed to 90 cue-phrases, as in the infrequent cues condition. However, on further 
210 of the 450 trials, for a total of 300 trials, these participants were exposed to sim-
ple arithmetic operations (e.g., 3 + 8 = 11). According to the cognitive load hypothe-
sis, if participants read these formulas (and perhaps covertly check the validity of the 
provided solution) just as they read irrelevant verbal cues in the IAM task, the for-
mulas should increase the cognitive load as would the additional verbal cues in the 
frequent cues condition, compared to the infrequent cues condition in which only 90 
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cue-phrases are presented. However, because particular formulas are very unlikely to 
match any records in participants’ memory, they should not create memory interfer-
ence. Thus, the cognitive load hypothesis predicts that the number of IAMs should 
be lower in the frequent cues and in the infrequent cues plus math conditions (both 
with higher cognitive load), compared to the infrequent cues condition (with lower 
cognitive load). By contrast, the memory interference hypothesis predicts an in-
creased rate of IAMs in both the infrequent cues and infrequent cues plus math con-
ditions, which are characterized by a low frequency of verbal cues (low memory in-
terference) compared to the frequent cues condition (high memory interference). 
In the present study, the focus was on quantitative measures of IAMs (num-
ber of involuntary memories and number of involuntary memories triggered by the 
cues, retrieval times). However qualitative (phenomenological characteristics) as-
pects of the retrieval of IAMs were analyzed for exploratory purposes.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants. Seventy two undergraduate students from the University of 
Florence (48 females, age range 18-33, M = 21.8 years) were randomly assigned to 
one of the three conditions, frequent cues (n = 24), infrequent cues (n = 24) or infre-
quent cues plus math (n = 24) conditions. Their first language was Italian, and they 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Age differences among the conditions 
were not significant (F <1). 
Materials. Vigilance task. The same vigilance task was used as in Vannucci et 
al. (2014, experimental condition “No IAM instructions/Self-interruption”). The task 
consisted of 450 trials, each remaining on the screen for 1.5 sec. Each showed a card 
depicting either a pattern of black horizontal (non-target stimuli) or black vertical lines 
          Cue frequency and involuntary memories 9 
(target stimuli). Target stimuli appeared randomly on 9 trials of the task. Not all par-
ticipants got target slides on exactly the same trials. As in previous studies (e.g. 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008) the target slides were presented pseudo-
randomly, that is every 40-60 trials (not fixed interval), in order to ensure that they 
occurred at long and irregular intervals. When either a cue word or a formula was 
included in a given trial, it was presented in size 18 Arial and placed in the middle of 
the card. 
The word-phrases that served as cues were selected from the pool of 800 
phrases used by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) and adapted to the Italian sample. 
Ten independent judges rated level of familiarity, imageability and concreteness of the 
cues on a 7-point scale (1 “low” - 7 “high”). The set of 90 word-phrases used in the infre-
quent cues condition was also used in the frequent cues condition. Moreover, the addition-
al 210 word-phrases used in the frequent cues condition did not differ for imageability, 
familiarity and concreteness from the other 90 word-phrases. A set of 210 arithmetic op-
erations in the form of easy sum and subtractions was prepared, and used in the infrequent 
cues + math condition. In each group, an equal number of positive (e.g. relaxing on a 
beach), neutral (e.g. washing hands) and negative (e.g. armed robbery) cues were 
used. The presentation order of the cues was pseudo-randomised for each participant 
 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire. Participants recorded details of their 
memories on a modified version of a questionnaire used by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili 
(2008). We asked participants to rate how often the memory had been thought 
of/rehearsed before (1 = never; 5 = many times), how pleasant or unpleasant the 
memory event was (1 = very unpleasant; 3 = neutral; 5 = very unpleasant), the inten-
sity of the feeling experienced during the retrieval (1 = none; 5 = a lot), whether the 
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remembered event was general or specific, and the life-period of the event (1 = 
childhood; 2 = adolescence; 3 = young adulthood). At the end of the experiment we 
also asked participants to rate on a 5-point scale their overall level of concentration 
during the vigilance task (1 = not at all concentrated; 5 = fully concentrated) and 
their level of boredom during the task (1 = not at all; 5 = very bored).  
Procedure. Participants were tested individually. In the information sheet 
explaining the vigilance task, they were instructed to say out loud ‘‘yes’’ to each 
target stimulus (vertical lines), and that they would also see words or arithmetic op-
erations in some of the trials. They were told that they were not supposed to do any-
thing with these items. It was explained that the condition they were taking part in 
was looking at how people could keep their concentration on the patterns and that in 
another condition participants would have to concentrate on the words or arithmetic 
operations. 
Participants were further instructed that, due to the task being quite monoto-
nous, they could find themselves thinking about other things, which was quite nor-
mal. Participants were asked to click the mouse to interrupt the presentation of the 
stimuli if any task-unrelated mental contents (thoughts, plans, considerations, past 
events, images, etc.) popped into their mind during the task (see Vannucci et al. 
2014). This would stop the vigilance task and allow them to write a short description 
of the mental content and to indicate whether it was triggered by internal thoughts, 
by an element in the environment or a word on the screen (if the mental content was 
triggered by a word on the screen, participants were asked to specify the word).  
They were told that this initial brief description of the mental content should be suf-
ficient to remind them of that specific mental content at the end of the vigilance task 
when they would be presented with the brief descriptions of their mental contents 
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and asked to complete a brief questionnaire. After the instructions, participants were 
given a short 20-trials practice of the vigilance task. As in the experimental session, 
they were allowed to stop the presentation if they had any task-unrelated thoughts. 
At the end of the vigilance task, participants were shown their descriptions of mental 
contents one by one and asked first to classify them as an involuntary memory or a 
non-memory thought. For each item classified as involuntary memory they had to 
also complete the brief questionnaire assessing various aspects of memories on rat-
ing scales.  
 
 
Results 
All participants completed the vigilance task successfully, with an average of 
8.79 (SD = .60) targets detected (out of 9), and no significant difference between the 
three groups (Frequent cues: M = 8.79, SD = .83; Infrequent cues:  M = 8.75, SD = 
.53; Infrequent cues + Math: 8.83, SD = .38)  (F < 1). 
No significant difference was found in the level of concentration in the three 
groups (p = .44). The mean level was 3.86 (SD = .86) for the total sample. Level of 
boredom was significantly higher in the infrequent cues + math group (M = 3.33, SD 
= .96) compared to the other two groups (infrequent cues, M = 2.00, SD = .93; fre-
quent cues, M = 2.30, SD = .93) (p < .001)1. 
Twelve out of 72 participants did not report any involuntary memories 
throughout the session, three in the frequent cues condition, two in the infrequent 
cues condition, and seven in the infrequent cues + math condition. Participants gen-
                                                          
1 Due to a technical error, the data of 3 participants (2 of the infrequent cues group and 1 of the fre-
quent cues group) were not recorded. 
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erated a total of 259 IAMs with a mean of 3.60 (SD = 3.82, range 0-19) per partici-
pant, and a total of 398 non-memory mental contents, with a mean of 5.53 (SD = 
6.57, range 0-31). Out of 259 IAMs, 86.49% were triggered by the word-phrases 
presented on the computer screen, 11.58% were triggered by internal thoughts and 
only 1.93% by other environmental cues.  
The frequencies of IAMs and non-memories as well as their qualitative rat-
ings in all experimental conditions can be found in Table 1. To assess the effects of 
the three experimental conditions on IAMs, the average number of IAMs per person 
was calculated and entered into a one way ANOVA. Results showed an effect of 
group, F (2, 69) = 9.39, MSE = 11.82 , p < .0001, with  the infrequent cues group re-
porting  more than twice  the number of IAMs reported by the frequent cues  (post 
hoc Bonferroni, p  < .005) and infrequent cues + math (p <.0005) groups, which in 
turn did not differ significantly from each other (p = 1.0) (see Figure 1). 
A similar pattern was obtained also with mental contents that were not mem-
ories (globally called thoughts), F (2, 69) = 5.25, MSE = 38.56, p < .01. The infre-
quent cues group reported more than twice the number of thoughts reported by the 
frequent cues group (post-hoc Bonferroni p < .05) and the infrequent cues + math 
group (p < .05) (see Figure 1). 
A similar pattern was obtained also when we limited the analyses to IAMs 
that participants reported as being triggered by the cues presented on the computer 
screen. For cue-triggered IAMs, the effect of condition was significant, F (2, 69) = 
7.34, MSE = 10.82, p < .001. More IAMs were reported with infrequent cues (M= 
5.17, SD = 4.81) than with frequent cues (M = 2.46, SD = 2.50, post-hoc Bonferroni, 
p < .05) or infrequent cues + math (M = 1.71, SD = 1.76, p < .005). These two last 
conditions were not significantly different. These results consistently show that the 
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infrequent cues condition was the most effective in eliciting both IAMs and 
thoughts. 
Next, we assessed whether the experimental manipulation affected the phe-
nomenological qualities of IAMs. The mean ratings for all recorded memory charac-
teristics were calculated for each participant before entering into several one-way 
ANOVAs. Analyses were first performed on the total number of IAMs and then on 
the subset of memories triggered by the cues. The Two-Step Adaptive Procedure of 
Benjamini-Hochberg (Benjamini, Krieger,  & Yekutieli 2006) was used to correct 
for multiple comparisons. This procedure provides an effective control of the false 
discovery rate while limiting the loss of statistical power associated to the Bonferro-
ni correction. No significant differences were found between the groups in any 
memory characteristic (see table 1).  
However, using the software GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 
2007), we estimated that the available sample size would allow us to detect only 
large effect sizes. Since any correction of the comparisonwise significance level 
to limit the inflation of Type I errors leads to a further decrease of statistical pow-
er, for exploratory purposes we repeated the analyses on the characteristics of IAMs 
(total number of IAMs) without such correction. A significant difference between 
the groups was found only in the intensity of the feeling experienced during the re-
trieval, F (2, 59) = 3.94, MSE = .39, p < .05. Post-hoc Bonferroni revealed that high-
er levels of intensity of feeling at retrieval were reported with frequent cues (M = 
3.94, SD = .68) than with infrequent cues (M = 3.44, SD = .59).   
For those IAMs and thoughts that were reported by participants as being trig-
gered by cues presented on the computer, it was also possible to calculate retrieval 
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times. When participants had an IAM or a thought, they clicked the mouse, and the 
computer recorded a reaction time (RT). Retrieval times were calculated by adding 
the RT for the present (clicked on) trial, to the RTs for all the trials back, up to the 
trial that presented the word that was reported by the participant as the trigger of the 
mental content. To assess the effect of the experimental conditions on retrieval times 
of IAMs, the median reaction time per person was calculated and entered into a one-
way ANOVA. No significant differences were found in the three groups (frequent 
cues: M = 12.31 sec, SD = 20.81 sec; infrequent cues: M = 5.65 sec, SD = 3.08 sec; 
infrequent cues + math: M = 4.95 sec, SD = 4.04 sec) (p = .14). The same pattern 
was found with thoughts (p =.71). Given that RTs in this experiment were skewed, 
we also repeated, after checking for outliers, the analysis of retrieval times of IAMs 
after log-transformation of RTs. This did not change the pattern of results, which 
again showed no reliable effect of the experimental group (p = .20). 
 
Discussion 
In everyday life autobiographical memories can come to mind spontaneously, 
without any deliberate attempt to recall. These involuntary memories are more likely 
to occur when one is engaged in automatic activities that require little attention and 
concentration (e.g., Berntsen & Hall 2004; Kvavilashvili & Mandler 2004) and in 
the presence of easy identifiable cues/triggers, mainly external as opposed to internal 
(e.g., Berntsen 1996; Berntsen & Hall 2004). These real-life observations led 
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) to develop a novel laboratory procedure to ex-
amine IAMs under well-controlled conditions. In the present study, we used a modi-
fied and improved version of this procedure (Mazzoni et al. 2014; Vannucci et al. 
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2014) and we confirmed its suitability for examining the phenomenon of IAMs. Not 
only were we able to obtain reliable levels of IAMs related to well-specified envi-
ronmental cues, we also demonstrated that the rate of incidence of IAMs can be ma-
nipulated by modifying the rate of cue presentation.  
The present study was largely motivated by a persistent enigma in the re-
search on IAMs: given that these memories are triggered by environmental cues and 
given the constant flow of such cues in real life, why we are not flooded by involun-
tary memories? The use of the laboratory procedure developed by Schlagman and 
Kvavilashvili (2008) allowed us to simultaneously test three hypotheses concerning 
this problem. The volume hypothesis suggests that relative scarcity of IAMs is due to 
the fact that only a small pool of quite specific cues is capable of eliciting such 
memories. The cognitive load hypothesis suggests that the analysis of the constant 
stream of environmental cues taxes the cognitive system in a way that precludes 
memory retrieval. The memory interference hypothesis suggests that rapid succes-
sion of environmental cues precludes the full development of IAMs because differ-
ent memories stimulated by various cues interfere with each other, stopping memory 
retrieval. 
The results of our study provide unequivocal support for the cognitive load 
hypothesis. We found that IAMs are by far more common under a relatively low 
frequency of presentation of environmental cues, when the cognitive system is less 
engaged in the analysis of external stimulation. This finding is inconsistent with the 
volume hypothesis as using more cues should increase rather than decrease the 
chances of obtaining a specific match between a cue and a related memory. Also, in-
cluding arithmetic operations alongside verbal cues in our task led to fewer IAMs. 
Arithmetic operations should not lead to episodic memory retrieval and thus the drop 
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in the number of IAMs caused by their inclusion in the task cannot be accounted for 
by the memory interference hypothesis. The result remains, however, fully con-
sistent with the cognitive load hypothesis, which clearly predicts that engaging the 
cognitive system in any type of demanding activity, whether verbal or non-verbal in 
nature, should reduce the number of IAMs, exactly as observed.  
By emphasising the role of cognitive load in spontaneous autobiographical 
retrieval, our results are in agreement with several previous observations. For exam-
ple, Kompus (2011) found that failures to incidentally retrieve memories were selec-
tively associated with reduced activation of the default mode network (lateral and 
medial parietal regions as well as ventromedial frontal cortex), a pattern consistently 
found when the cognitive demands increase (e.g. Raichle et al. 2001), which is relat-
ed to disruption of task-irrelevant thoughts (McKiernan et al. 2006). 
In their studies on visual attention, Forster and Lavie (2008a, 2008b) have 
shown that a stimulus onset may capture attention even when it is irrelevant to the 
task and to any attentional settings associated with task performance. The cost of this 
capture by external distractors is a robust interference on the task performance. Our 
results suggest that, when the task is easy, monotonous and undemanding, external 
stimuli presented at high rates do not interfere with the behavioral performance in 
the vigilance task but with the involuntary occurrence of memories and thoughts.  
It is also interesting to note that the results of our manipulation were the same 
for IAMs and for other non-memory mental contents– mental images or other mental 
contents that did not refer to a specific autobiographical memory. The effects of 
cognitive load observed here on non-memory contents are consistent with the results 
of previous studies on daydreaming and task-unrelated thoughts (Singer 1966, 
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1975), which showed that frequency of task-unrelated thoughts decreases when cog-
nitive demands increased.  
Interestingly, our manipulation of cue frequency strongly affected the num-
ber of IAMs, with less, if any, effect on their characteristics. On the one hand the 
null findings reported here might suggest that the characteristics of IAMs, as a par-
ticular type of mental contents, are largely unaffected by the way cognitive load im-
pacts upon the process of creating them. However, the absence of evidence is not ev-
idence of the absence: hence, a closer look at the data using a more explorative ap-
proach (justified by the small sample and the consequently reduced statistical power) 
showed a moderate effect of the rate of external cues on the intensity of the feeling 
experienced during the retrieval: IAMs reported by the “frequent cues” group were 
characterized by a stronger emotional experience during retrieval compared to IAMs 
reported by the “infrequent cues” group. Although this result needs to be replicated, 
it seems to suggest that in presence of high competition between memories at re-
trieval and high cognitive load, the few reported IAMs are the ones accompanied by 
a stronger emotional experience. Future studies should investigate further this aspect 
and they should also assess the effect on other characteristics of the memory, such as 
the degree of self-involvement in the event portrayed in the memory, or how the 
content is linked to self-relevant goals, etc., which have not been assessed in the pre-
sent study and, indeed, represent crucial elements in autobiographical memory (see 
for example the model by Conway, 2005). 
The exact mechanism by which cognitive load influences the occurrence of 
task-irrelevant thoughts more broadly, and IAMs more specifically, also remains to 
be established. One possibility includes the involvement of attentional processes op-
erating within the working memory system. Working memory may be occupied by 
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the ongoing, cognitively-demanding processing, precluding the spontaneous for-
mation of involuntary memories (see Baddeley, 1993). However, a long tradition of 
research documenting a relatively minor role of attentional resources in retrieval 
from long-term memory seems to argue against the attentional basis of the described 
effects. For example, Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, and Anderson (1996) showed 
that dividing attention at study has profound effects on memory performance but di-
viding attention at the time of retrieval leaves memory performance unaffected. Al-
so, studies that focused on the role of working memory in memory retrieval have 
generally stressed that this role is confined to strategic and controlled aspects of re-
trieval, such as specifying cues appropriate for accessing sought after information in 
memory (e.g., Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2013). In the present study the focus is 
on spontaneous retrieval. Hence the need for cue specification and other strategic 
aspects of retrieval should be circumvented, possibly downplaying the role of work-
ing memory. On the other hand, some recent studies suggest that the resistance of 
memory retrieval to manipulations taxing attentional resources might have been 
overstated in the literature. For example, Jones, Marsh, and Hughes (2012) showed 
that auditory distraction present at the time of retrieval from long-term memory does 
adversely affect the effectiveness of retrieval processes. If word-phrases and algebra 
presented in our study play the same role as the auditory distraction presented by 
Jones et al. (2012), then the role of diverted attentional resources in limiting retrieval 
of autobiographical memories cannot be excluded. 
A variant of this attentional hypothesis implicates inhibitory mechanism as 
responsible for limiting access to the autobiographical memory system. Performing 
cognitively-demanding activities might require recruiting attentional inhibition to-
wards associative processes that would otherwise lead to the activation of involun-
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tary memories and thoughts (see Mandler 1994). Hasher and her colleagues (e.g., 
Hasher, Zacks, & May 1999) argued for an important role of inhibitory processes in 
supporting performance in the focal task. Interestingly, the inhibitory framework al-
lows for formulating predictions that could be tested in further studies. First, inhibi-
tory processes are known to be deficient in older adults (e.g., Healey, Hasher, & 
Cambell 2013) and this suggests that older adults may be less effective in limiting 
spontaneous retrieval of autobiographical memories under conditions of continuous 
external stimulation. Second, the recruitment of inhibitory processes is known to 
have, at least sometimes, lasting after-effects, limiting subsequent memory access to 
information undergoing inhibition (Healey, Cambell, Hasher, & Ossher 2010). If at-
tentional inhibition is responsible for limiting spontaneous autobiographical memo-
ries in the present study, then it could be that access to inhibited memories, even a 
voluntary one would be impaired following the main experimental task. These pos-
sibilities await further research.   
Moreover, apart from these possibilities, there is also one more possible expla-
nation of the pattern of IAMs observed in the present study. A high cue frequency 
and the related additional cognitive demands may not so much affect the process of 
forming mental contents, but rather influence participants’ awareness of their inter-
nal state and current contents of their own mind. Recently it has been proposed that 
in mind wandering, meta-awareness (i.e. one’s explicit knowledge of current 
thoughts’ contents) corresponds to an intermittent process whereby individuals only 
periodically notice the current contents of their mind. Direct comparisons between 
self-catching measures of the mind-wandering state and probe-catching sampling 
have shown that individuals routinely mind wander without noticing it (zoning out) 
(see for a review and discussion, Schooler et al. 2011). In a recent study, Vannucci 
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et al. (2014) found that people do not always notice that they have had a 
memory/thought during a vigilance task and they might then omit reporting them on 
numerous occasions. However, if stopped during the task they might become aware 
of having memories/thoughts at the moment or seconds earlier. In a related vein, we 
propose here that an increase in cognitive load, due to presenting many cues, might 
have a negative effect on the level of awareness of these task-unrelated mental con-
tents, as external stimuli capture attention, leaving fewer of the resources available 
that are necessary in becoming aware of what happens during a mind-wandering 
task. Future studies should further examine this hypothesis, by using a probe catch-
ing method instead of the self-catching method employed here and by assessing the 
level of awareness of the mental state (e.g. aware vs unaware mind-wandering, in 
Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith & Schooler 2009).  
The present findings, which deserve further investigation, provide an im-
portant contribution to our knowledge as to why, in our daily life, we are not con-
stantly flooded by IAMs (Berntsen 2009). What our study demonstrates is that ex-
ternal stimulation responsible for IAMs may at the same time serve as a factor limit-
ing the incidence of involuntary memories. Whenever we stop to analyze, consider, 
scrutinize incoming stimulation, we effectively engage in cognitive activities that in-
crease the cognitive load, reducing the chances that we will experience a conscious 
autobiographical memory.  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Number of involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and non-
memories (thoughts) as a function of the experimental group (frequent cues, infre-
quent cues, infrequent cues + math).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
